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7.1  Introduction 
The most arresting characteristics of Japan’s  industrialization through  the 
mid-twentieth century are its strongly military character and the development 
of a differential structure between traditional and modem sectors. The begin- 
ning of Japan’s modem economic growth  is often associated with the Meiji 
Ishin, a political, social, and economic upheaval that took place over several 
decades in the late nineteenth century. During this time, the bakuhan regime, 
which  had  been  in power  since  1600, was  overthrown  in  numerous  coups 
d’Ctat. In its place, a government was created in 1868  that restored authority to 
the emperor.’ In order to stave off the encroaching colonization they observed 
around them in Asia, the new leaders concentrated their efforts on building a 
“rich country and strong army” Cfukoku kyydhei). To this end they promulgated 
a constitution in  1889 that granted power to the bureaucracy and military, es- 
tablished  compulsory education and conscription, and promoted industry by 
importing technology and scientific knowledge from the West. 
During the initial decades of the Meiji period (1868-1926)  the government 
established a national banking system and standardized currency issued by the 
central  Bank of Japan. The development  of  extensive sea transportation and 
railroad networks followed, which facilitated the integration of national mar- 
kets. The financial and transportation infrastructure speeded the expansion of 
the mining and textile industries, as the government sold its initial interests in 
technology  imported from Europe and the United States to private concerns. 
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Then the boom of World War I ushered in a period of increased production, a 
rise in employment in secondary industries, and the development of heavy and 
chemical industries spurred by the harnessing and generation of electric power. 
Japan’s industrial activities were largely concentrated in a narrow urban belt 
extending  from Eky6 on  the  eastern  half  of  the  main  island  of  Honshii, 
through Nagoya and Osaka in western  Honshii, to Fukuoka in the northern 
section of Kyiishii. 
By 1940 Japan had built a colonial empire that included Taiwan, Korea, and 
Manchuria, and an economic infrastructure large enough to wage serious war 
with the Western allies and extend its control through north China, Burma, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. Japan’s imperialist drive 
through Asia began in the Meiji period with the Taiwan expedition in 1874 and 
ended with the staggering blows that the United States dealt Japan finally to 
end the Pacific War. For all the excitement generated during the Meiji period 
over building a new state founded on principles of civilization, enlightenment, 
and human rights, for all the effort channeled into creating a new kind of em- 
peror--a  spiritual and timeless head of a divine people united by a pure and 
native soul-for  all the capital, financial and human, invested in the drive to 
industrialize, Japan’s modern economic growth led not to a liberal democratic 
society but to an unfree people governed by an expansionist military regime 
and ruled by an absolutist imperial system. 
Closely linked to military expansion was the development of large-scale in- 
dustry in communication, transportation, banking, trade, arms, chemicals, and 
metallurgy. Many of these industries were the cornerstones of enormous con- 
glomerates (zaibatsu)  such as Sumitomo (Bank, Metals, Rubber, Construction) 
and Mitsubishi (Bank, Heavy Industries, Motor, Petrochemical, and Trading). 
Because these industries served the needs of  the state, powerful  bureaucra- 
cies-Ministry  of  Posts  and  Telecommunications,  Ministry  of  Munitions, 
Ministry of Transportation-were  established to facilitate financing and man- 
age output to meet national  goals. Capital investment in plant and facilities, 
research and development, and rationalization of operations greatly boosted 
the productivity  of  these so-called modern industries relative to agriculture 
and traditional or small-scale industries. Real wage differentials between em- 
ployees of the modem sector and those of the agricultural and traditional sec- 
tors reflected the productivity differentials. The industrial boom of World War 
I and the ensuing agricultural depression of the 1920s created a skilled labor 
shortage in the modem sector and excess labor in the traditional, which further 
widened productivity and real wage differentials. In addition, monopolistic po- 
sitions held by the zaibatsu enabled them to take advantage of lower wages 
by subcontracting work to small-scale firms. By the mid- 1930s the widening 
differentials in productivity and real wages between the modem and traditional 
sectors (hereafter referred to as the “differential structure”) had become a pro- 
nounced characteristic of the Japanese economy, to the detriment of agriculture 
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The purpose of  this paper is to examine the effects of militarization  and 
formation of the differential structure on the health and well-being of the Japa- 
nese people during the period of industrialization from the Meiji Zshin through 
the Pacific War. The hypotheses driving the analysis are (1) investment in the 
military  diverted funds that would  otherwise have gone into improving the 
health of the people, such as investment in social welfare, public health tech- 
nology, and sanitation, which  resulted in poorer health, and (2)  just as real 
wages reflected  the gaps in technology  between the modem and traditional 
sectors, so gaps in measures of health-nutritional  status, mortality, and fertil- 
ity-reflected  gaps in real wages, leading to the formation of  a differential 
structure in health. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 7.2 discusses the 
health and welfare of the Japanese people before industrialization; section 7.3 
introduces the foundation of modem economic growth and its attendant wars 
and epidemics; section 7.4 looks at the relationship between industrialization 
and  nutritional  status with respect  to stature,  diet  and  nutrition,  and  child 
growth; section 7.5 analyzes differential health; and section 7.6 concludes with 
a discussion of the results in the light of the proposed hypotheses. 
7.2  Health and Welfare before Industrialization, 1600-1868 
7.2.1  Bakuhan Political Economy 
Though the first power looms that arrived from England in the 1880s might 
be interpreted as the seeds of Japan’s industrial revolution, factors that eased 
the transition from an agricultural to an industrial society had long been devel- 
oping during the Tokugawa period (  1600-1868).2 The bakuhan government in 
power during the Tokugawa period was characterized by a decentralized sys- 
tem of roughly  150 feudal lords (daimyd)  who controlled their respective fiefs 
(han),  collected taxes from the peasants residing in their domains, and paid 
them to the military  seat of power  (bakufu).  In turn, to offset the autonomy 
granted to the daimyd and to minimize risk of collusion among them, the ba- 
kufu required them to reside for six months out of the year in the capital city 
of Edo (now T6ky6) and often kept their families there as hostages. Accompa- 
nied by an entourage of  servants, vassals, and flagbearers (the greater the en- 
tourage, the greater the perceived status), the daimyd, in their conspicuous con- 
sumption during the biannual treks to and from their han, contributed to the 
development of a mobile population  and sophisticated commercial economy 
by the mid-nineteenth century. 
Ogyn Sorai (1666-1728),  counsel to the bakufu and arguably the most in- 
fluential intellectual of  the  eighteenth century, caustically observed that the 
2. This period is named after Tokugawa Ieyasu, the legendary warrior who subdued his rivals 
and unified the entire country in 1600. 254  Gail Honda 
constant transit of the daimyd was turning the entire samurai class into perma- 
nent hotel guests, so that “even a single chopstick had to be paid  The 
inns, restaurants, teahouses, and shops selling provisions that sprang up along 
the well-trodden routes leading to Edo were run or financed by the merchants, 
considered the lowest of all four classes (samurai-farmer-artisan-merchant) be- 
cause of their association with money and profit. Moreover, since samurai lived 
on fixed stipends decreed by  the bakufu they could afford their extravagant 
lifestyles only by incurring large debts with the merchant class. Thus, though 
merchants were ostensibly at the bottom of the social ladder, they in fact held 
the greatest economic power, fostered close ties with the bakufu, and were 
extremely sophisticated in their thinking on monetary and fiscal p01icy.~ 
7.2.2  Capital Formation 
It was the Tokugawa peasants, however, who created the capital surplus that 
enabled the Meiji government to self-finance the initial steps of  industrializa- 
tion and infrastructure devel~pment.~  Increased productivity and development 
of arable land led to a rise in agricultural output during this period, while pe- 
riodic  famine, increasing  age  at  marriage,  and  decreasing marital  fertility 
stemmed population growth.6  This led to a rise in per capita agricultural output 
from around 1720 through the mid-nineteenth century. Changes in population 
growth, area of arable land, grain output, and corresponding per capita figures 
are given in table 7.1. 
The numbers show rapid population growth from 1600 to 1720, then very 
little through 1850.  Grain output, on the other hand, grew by 50 percent during 
the period of no population growth. This meant an increase of about 40 percent 
in per capita grain output during the latter half of the Tokugawa period. Due to 
the scattered nature of economic data from the Tokugawa period, no GDP fig- 
ures exist. However, grain output serves as a reasonable proxy for demonstra- 
ting growth trends in GDP. This is because grain production accounted for at 
least two-thirds of agricultural production, which in turn occupied at least 80 
percent of the labor force. Moreover, rice was the standard currency of  ex- 
change in which wages and taxes were paid. 
If per capita grain output (GDP) was increasing, did this lead to an improved 
standard of living for the Tokugawa population? The evidence for the answer 
to this question is even sketchier, but the overall conclusion appears to be that 
3. For more of Ogya’s incisive comments on Tokugawa economy and society, see Maruyama 
(1974). 
4.  For an exposition of the critical role Tokugawa merchants played in laying the intellectual 
foundations of  the country’s political economy, see Najita (1987). 
5. For an international comparison of the “legacy of  seclusion” that resulted in levels of  capital 
adequate for self-financed industrialization, see Rosovsky (1961, 55-104). 
6. For an analysis of  age at marriage, see Hayami (1968, 1978). A  synopsis of  why marital 
fertility decreased can be found in Saitb (1992a). The discrepancy between agricultural output and 
population growth and its contribution to  economic growth is discussed in Hanky and Yama- 
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Table 7.1  Changes in Various Economic Measures, 1600-1872 
Arable  Grain 
Population  Land  output 
Period  (N)  (R)  (Y)  RIN  YIN  YIR 
1600  12,000  2,065  19,73  1  0.1721  1.644  9.55 
1650  17,180  2,354  23,133  0.1370  1.346  9.83 
1700  27,690  2,841  30,630  0. I026  1.106  10.78 
1720  31,280  2,927  32,034  0.0936  1.024  10.94 
1730  32,080  2,971  32,736  0.0926  1.020  11.02 
1750  31,100  2,991  34,140  0.0962  1.098  11.41 
1800  30,650  3,032  37,650  0.0989  1.228  12.42 
1850  32,280  3,170  41,160  0.0982  1.275  12.98 
1872  33,110  3,234  46,812  0.0977  1.414  14.47 
Source: Hayami and Miyamoto (1988). 
Nofe: Units are N  in  1,000; R  in 1,000 chd  (1 chd  = 2.45 acres);  Y in  1.000 koku (1 koku = 
180 liters). 
if one “survived” abortion, infanticide, epidemics, and famine, one could enjoy 
a reasonably favorable standard of living. Stories of abortion and infanticide 
are legion, though quantitative evidence indicates that these forms of birth con- 
trol were not used primarily to reduce family size in times of poverty, but were 
practiced by rich and poor alike as a form of family planning.’ Also, while per 
capita grain output was increasing on a countrywide level, these numbers do 
not take into account regional and intervillage differences in yield and climate. 
Occasional crop failures and cold, wet climatic conditions led to periodic fam- 
ines and outbreaks of infectious diseases that razed certain village populations 
and held the country’s population growth in check (see Jannetta 1992). 
7.2.3  Self-Help and Community Aid as Social Welfare 
Periodic surges in mortality due to subsistence crises, when per capita sur- 
pluses in grain were increasing, suggest that the bakuhan government failed to 
effect an efficient countrywide food distribution system and adequate welfare 
measures for those in need. In keeping with Confucian ethics, which empha- 
size diligence and thrift, relief for the destitute took the form of assisting only 
victims of disaster and those physically  unable to work. Also, the Confucian 
hierarchy of  human relationships stressed the benevolent rule of the daimyd 
over his subjects and called for a more personal rather than institutional form 
of aid. In the farm villages in times of crop failure, richer neighbors and rela- 
tives were called upon to help their poorer counterparts. In the cities, poor- 
7. This was the startling finding in Smith (1977). Smith writes, “Large landholders practiced it 
as well as small, and registered births were as numerous in bad as in good growing years. Also, 
infanticide seems to have been used to control the sex sequence and spacing of births and the 
sexual composition and final size of  families. In short, it gives the impression of a kind of family 
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houses and workhouses were established to feed and shelter vagrants, but their 
main purpose was to get able-bodied vagabonds back to work again through 
training programs and moral suasion. This is in contrast to England and Ger- 
many, which had more institutionalized and ongoing forms of welfare.8 
In theory, the purpose of government should be the economic well-being of 
society, according to Dazai Shundai (1680-1747),  a leading figure in Toku- 
gawa intellectual and political circles. Specifically, he defined political econ- 
omy as keisei saimin, which means “gauging actual economic conditions and 
rendering aid to the people for general social order and well-being.” Economic 
well-being and the accumulation of wealth would be effected through  trade 
among various  sectors and at all levels of society. The role of government, 
then, would be to manage (keiei)  from above in order to ensure optimal condi- 
tions for trade and wealth accumulation. The enduring legacy of Dazai’s theo- 
ries can be observed in Japanese political economy today: its “managed econ- 
omy,” trade surpluses, and the modem Japanese word for economics, keizai, 
an elision of keisei  aimi in.^ 
Government  aid in Dazai’s sense could thus be described as encouraging 
self-sufficiency  and  intersocietal  trade.  Most  commoners  organized  them- 
selves into communal associations called ka that arranged loans, mutual assis- 
tance in times of emergency, and life and health insurance among other forms 
of  aid for its members. The ubiquitous nature of  ka and the degree to which 
people relied on them rather than the state are evident in the observation that 
every single village in Japan has at least one ka. One government survey in the 
late nineteenth century put the  number of M in Japan at around 350,000.’0 
Thus, in the absence of statewide provisions  for social welfare, commoners 
created their own forms of insurance and credit at the local level. The existence 
of periodic famines and epidemics does not mean that ka and stopgap forms 
of assistance were ineffectual; only that they had their limits in reducing mor- 
tality in times of disaster. 
7.2.4  Longevity and Nutritional Status 
Nevertheless, those who survived enjoyed relatively long and healthy lives. 
Life expectancy at birth as shown in table 7.2 varied widely over place and 
time but was comparable to, if not better than, life expectancy in England and 
Wales during the same period. This evidence refutes the long-held  view of 
preindustrial Japan  as a backward, impoverished  society  of  starving people 
dying early and killing their newborn to limit family size. Life expectancy in 
Tokugawa Japan was bolstered by the absence of war and relative lack of pesti- 
lence. Whereas much of preindustrial Europe was ravaged by bloody military 
campaigns, there were no wars in Japan from 1600  through the mid-nineteenth 
8. This discussion of Japanese and Western welfare measures is from an exposition by Garon 
9. For the theoretical underpinnings of Japan’s political economy in the thought of Dazai Shun- 
10. For the intellectual origins and various manifestations of k6, see Najita (1988). 
( 1994). 
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Table 1.2  Life Expectancy at Birth in Japan and in England and Wales, 
1700-1854 
Japan  England and Wales 































43.3  1700-1725  35.1 
38.6 
43.2 
36.4  1725-50  33.8 
39.1 
32.0  1750-75  36.3 
55.0 
44.9  1775-1800  37.0 
36.5 
24.1 
Sources: Japan, SaitG (1992b); England and Wales, Fogel (1986). 
Note: For England and Wales, life expectancy is for both sexes by birth cohort. 
century. Also, although almost everyone in Tokugawa Japan contracted small- 
pox and some succumbed to measles and dysentery, the major killer diseases 
in premodern Europe-plague  and typhus-did  not appear in Japan before 
industrialization." 
When major famines did strike, the famine mortality rates were higher for 
males than they were for females. This phenomenon in which females exhibit 
greater resistance  than  males  under  conditions  of  environmental  stress has 
been observed and documented in many studies from Bengal to Greece, during 
famines and during wartime. It may be attributable to the larger stores of body 
fat in women (see Jannetta 1992, 437; Eveleth and Tanner 1990, 200). Of the 
three major famines in the Tokugawa period-the  KybhB famine (1722-33), 
the Tenmei famine (1783-87),  and the Tenp6 famine (1  833-37)-the  Tenmei 
famine was the most severe in terms of population loss and recovery time. The 
relatively short period of data available for the Mikawa sample in Japan shown 
in table 7.2, and the coincidence of the data years with the Tenmei famine, may 
account for most of the large difference in life expectancy between males and 
females. To a lesser extent the Bizen  sample also exhibits a sex difference, 
which may be attributed to the effect of the Tenp6 famine. Differences in esti- 
mated  life expectancy among samples in table 7.2 may arise not only from 
actual  regional  differences  but  also  from differences  in  the  kinds  of  data 
sources.12 
11. This is probably due to Japan's geographic isolation and very limited contact with foreign 
cultures. Trade was restricted to a single port at the southern tip of the island of Kyushii for 250 
years. See Jannetta (1987). 
12. Buddhist temple registers (kakochd), from which the Chikuzen and Hida data are taken, 
record all deaths, infant as well as adult. Population registers (shrlmon  arufume chd), from which 
all other data in table 7.2 were retrieved, record only those who survived from birth to the subse- 
quent compilation. See Jannetta and Preston (1991,419-20)  and Cornell and Hayami (1986,321). 258  Gail Honda 
Table 7.3  Estimation of Height Based on Length of Right Femur 600 B.C.  to 
A.D.  1900 
Period  Female  Male 
Name 
Mean  Mean 
Years  N  (m)  N  (m) 
Jiknon  600-200  B.C.  9  1.480  11  1.591 
Yayoi  200 B.C.  t0 A.D.  250  14  1.505  12  1.614 
Kofun/Nara/Heian  250-1 185  9  1.515  22  1.631 
Kamakura  I 185-1 333  5  1.449  17  1.590 
Muromachihlomoyama  I 333-1 600  17  1.466  26  1.568 
Tokugawa  1600-1868  45  1.456  95  1.571 
Early Meiji  1868-1900  43  1.448  43  1.553 
Source: Hiramoto (1972). 
The nutritional status of Tokugawa society also appears to have been fairly 
high and above subsistence level. Engel’s coefficient for food has been esti- 
mated at 0.6-0.8,  but income elasticity for food was in the 0.3-0.4  range as 
additional income was spent not on more or better food, but on entertainment, 
travel, and capital  investment^.'^ Diet seems to have been nutritious though low 
in animal protein  and  showed little variation  across income levels and over 
time. It consisted primarily of rice-usually  mixed with other grains like bar- 
ley, millet, and buckwheat-which  was served at every meal. Supplementing 
the grains would be soybean products like tofu or miso (soybean paste), greens 
and root vegetables, pickled condiments, and dried seafood products. One of 
the standard measures of nutritional status, height, has been estimated for the 
Tokugawa period based on measurements of the maximum length of the right 
femur. These estimates are given in table 7.3 along with those for the other 
major periods in Japanese history dating back to 600 B.C. 
The Tokugawa bone samples were dug up at a construction site in Tokyb 
proper and are thought to be from commoners’ graves. Bone samples from the 
early Meiji  period  were  also unearthed  from within T6ky6 proper  and  are 
thought to be those of common laborers who died from illness or execution. 
Thus, the two samples may be considered comparable with respect to socio- 
economic class. Since anyone in Japan who could afford a proper funeral and 
burial  would have been cremated, it is safe to assume that both samples are 
from the remains of the poor or indigent. Although the sample sizes are small, 
these estimates show that the average Tokugawa female was almost 1 cm taller 
than her early Meiji counterpart; the Tokugawa male nearly 2 cm taller than 
his. With 95 percent confidence intervals of 4 cm, these numbers must be used 
with caution. Nevertheless,  they suggest at least that, among the lower socio- 
13. This is baed on an analysis of budgets for a Tokugawa carpenter, farmer, and samurai in 
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economic classes, Japanese nutritional status during the Tokugawa period was 
no worse than that during the period of early industrialization. 
7.2.5 
The health and welfare of the Japanese people during the 250 years prior to 
industrialization were good relative to that of the population of contemporary 
Europe and early industrial Japan. Population  size held steady from 1720 to 
1872 at about 32 million due to a combination of increasing age at marriage, 
lower marital fertility rates, use of birth control, occasional crises of  subsis- 
tence, and outbreaks of infectious diseases. Improved agricultural technology 
and better land development resulted in rising per capita grain output. A proxy 
for per capita GDP, it increased 40 percent over the same period, which sug- 
gests an increasing standard of living. 
The effect of government policy that had as its goal the economic well-being 
of the people and of  a welfare system that stressed self-help and communal 
assistance over institutional forms of aid is more difficult to measure. During 
times of the most severe famine, there were significant crises of subsistence 
and surges in mortality. This is evidence of a flawed distribution system and a 
sign that perhaps more institutional forms of welfare were needed. Neverthe- 
less, Tokugawa commoners managed to provide insurance and loans and other 
forms of aid to one another through communal k6, in times both good and bad. 
There were no epidemics on the scale witnessed in premodern Europe and 
in Japan during the later period of industrialization. In addition, there were no 
wars in Japan from 1600 until the mid-nineteenth century. This relative absence 
of calamitous events resulted  in a life expectancy at birth that varied widely 
with time and place but was comparable to, if not better than, life expectancy 
in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century  England and Wales. The Japanese diet, 
virtually unchanged until the mid-twentieth  century, was nutritious. The low 
income elasticity for food suggests that more income did not  mean people 
bought more or better food. Estimates of the average height of Tokugawa com- 
moners show that their nutritional status was no worse, and perhaps better, than 
that of commoners in the early period of industrialization that followed. 
Summary: Tokugawa Health and Welfare 
7.3  Foundations of Modern Economic Growth 
7.3.1  Building a Rich Country and Strong Army 
Meiji Ishin is the name given to the political, economic, and social revolu- 
tion waged by self-proclaimed emperor loyalists (shishi)  who overthrew mili- 
tary (shogun)  rule in the name of Emperor Meiji. The new government officials 
opened Japan’s ports to foreign trade and engaged in cultural exchange after 
more than 250 years of  seclusion from the rest of  the world. Those who em- 
barked on diplomatic missions to the West were amazed by the scientific and 
industrial achievements of Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. Us- 260  Gail Honda 
ing Western models gleaned from abroad, Meiji state architects instituted na- 
tional conscription, compulsory  elementary education, and land tax reform. 
Japan was set on a rapid course of industrialization and economic expansion in 
a quest to build a “rich country and strong army” Cfukoku kydhei) and maintain 
national independence. 
The four pillars of the shokusun kdgyd (“increase production, promote enter- 
prise”) policy set forth in the 1870s were (1) establishment of a national bank- 
ing system, (2) development of transportation and communication networks, 
(3) creation and subsequent sale of public  sector factories, and (4) loans to 
private firms. The han system of duimyd rule was dismantled and the prefec- 
tural system established. Many reforms were enacted which liberalized social 
relationships and economic transactions. The class system (samurai-farmer- 
artisan-merchant) was abolished, and restrictions on occupational mobility and 
buying and selling of land were lifted. Japan became, by  all appearances, a 
modem state. 
Beneath the facade of a budding liberal democratic society, however, lay the 
foundations of an absolutist military regime unwilling to relinquish power to 
the people. The parliament (Diet), which opened in 1890, was originally voted 
in only by  those who could afford the high price of  a ballot, that is, wealthy 
industrialists and landlords. The military character of and impetus to economic 
growth remained a constant force from its well-intentioned origins to the insid- 
ious takeover of the economy in the  1930s. With state-run arms production a 
major industry, one of the greatest stimulants to economic growth during the 
early period of  industrialization was war: the Sino-Japanese War  (1894-95) 
and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5).  Though Japan was not a direct partici- 
pant, World War I (1914-1 8) was a boon to exports as Japan supplied markets 
normally  served by European countries then occupied with the war. Indeed, 
growth rates of GNP rose to 4-7  percent in the late 1890s, 11 percent in 1904, 
and 6-9  percent during World War I (calculated from Ohkawa et al. 1974). 
Overall, the Japanese growth rate from 1868 to 1940 is estimated at some- 
where between 3 and 4 percent. During the Meiji period (1868-1912),  new 
monetary and national banking systems were developed, and the foundations 
of modern industry established. Once sea and rail transportation networks were 
in place, coal and metal mining developed to the extent that copper was Japan’s 
fifth most important export in 1900. The textile industries, notably silk reeling 
and cotton spinning, followed mining to become a leading component of Ja- 
pan’s exports. World War I ushered in the boom age of heavy industries such 
as  chemicals,  metals,  and  machinery,  fueled  by  newly  harnessed  electric 
power. Then the economy suffered a number of  blows: namely, the panic of 
1920, the agricultural depression of the 1920s, the great Kant6 earthquake of 
1923, the financial panic of  1927, and the downturn of  the  1930s due to the 
worldwide depression. By  1940, the War with China had broken out, and the 
Japanese were on the verge of war with the United States. The final decade of 261  Industrialization in Japan, 1868-1940 
Table 7.4  Employed Population by Sector, 1872-1940 
Year  Primary 
I872  15,525 
(72.6) 
1885  15,654 
(70.1) 
1890  15,637 
(67.8) 
1895  15,482 
(6.5.3) 
1900  15,853 
(6.5.0) 
1905  16,707 
(69.5) 
1910  16,383 
(67.1) 
1915  14,615 
(62.5) 
I920  14,388 
(55.3) 
1925  14,056 
(52.4) 
1930  14,648 
1935  14,450 
(48.7) 
I940  14,523 
(47.7) 
(52.1) 






















































Source: Nakamura (1983,21). 
Note: Population in thousands (by percentage in parentheses). Primary sector = agriculture, for- 
estry, and  fisheries. Secondary sector = mining, manufacturing, and construction. Tertiary sec- 
tor = transportation, communication, utilities, commerce, services, and public administration. 
the period  was characterized  by  heavy industrialization  to  support the mil- 
itary.I4 
The changing composition of the economy as indicated by labor force par- 
ticipation in various sectors is shown in table 7.4. The percentage engaged in 
the primary sector declined by one-third, from 73 percent to 48 percent. Losses 
in the primary sector beginning in the early twentieth century fed directly into 
the other two sectors, both of which showed steady increases until 1940. The 
percentage of  the total population  attributed to the secondary sector nearly 
doubled from  15 percent to 27 percent between  1905 and 1940. Most of the 
increase occurred in manufacturing. Commercial activities, followed by corn- 
14. For more detailed analyses of the Japanese prewar economy, see Nakamura (1983) or Oh- 
kawa and Rosovsky (1973). 262  Gail Honda 
Table 7.5  Growth of Japanese Urban Population, 1891-1940 
Urban  Total 
Population  Population  Percentage 









































Source; Wilkinson (1965,45). 
Wban = population in incorporated cities (shi). 
munications and transportation, accounted for most of the increase in the ter- 
tiary sector. The initial high percentage of  tertiary workers in the nineteenth 
century is attributed to the large portion of the population engaged in tradi- 
tional  services  such  as domestic servitude, entertainment,  retail  trade,  and 
small commercial proprietorships. 
The transition of Japan from a largely agricultural society to one in which 
over half of the population was engaged in nonagricultural activities was ac- 
companied by a redistribution of the labor force from rural to urban areas. The 
absolute and proportionate growth of the population in incorporated cities (shi) 
from 1891 to 1940 is shown in table 7.5. From 1891 to 1940, the percentage 
of Japan's total population living in cities of 20,000 or more jumped from 9.4 
percent to 37.6 percent. In other words, in 50 years, the proportion of the popu- 
lation living in cities of 20,000 or more went from less than one-tenth to over 
one-third. Comparable increases in the percentages of urban population took 
80 years (1780-1860)  in England and Wales and 75 years (1850-1925)  in the 
United States (Wilkinson 1965, 37). 
The rapid urbanization witnessed in Japan was initially spurred by the sud- 
den opening of the country to the rest of the world in the late nineteenth cen- 
tury and the expansion of international trade. Though there were well over 400 
incorporated cities by  1920, six great metropolitan centers accounted for one- 
half to two-thirds of the urban population of the prewar period. Of these six- 
Tokyb, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, Kbbe, and Kybtb-only  Kybtb, the ancient 
capital and cultural center of Japan, was not a major port city or closely associ- 
ated with an export center. The later wave of urbanization in the 1930s resulted 
from the agricultural depression of the 1920s and the collapse of the silk mar- 
ket due to the worldwide depression in the 1930s. Displaced laborers flocked 263  Industrialization in Japan, 1868-1940 
Table 7.6  Estimated Literacy Rates for Various Groups, 1897-1941 
Estimated 
Sample  Percentage 
Year  Population  Literate 
1897  Osaka factory workers  21.5 
1902  Osaka conscripts  53.1 
1907  Osaka conscripts  66.1 
1912  Osaka conscripts  74.8 
1925  All conscripts  88.7 
1933  All conscripts  95.8 
1941  All conscripts  98.5 
Source; Taira (1971, 378-81). 
Note:  Percentage of  sample with at  least a lower elementary  school education (four years of 
school, six years from 1907 on) used as proxy for literacy. The 1897 sample = factory workers in 
Osaka; 1902-12  sample = conscripts in Osaka; 1925-41  sample = conscripts in all of Japan. 
to the major industrial centers for jobs in the burgeoning military industries of 
chemicals, oil, shipbuilding, and munitions (Wilkinson 1965,44-50). 
The use of  increasingly sophisticated technology in Japan’s science-based 
industries and the growth of white-collar service industries in the early twenti- 
eth century required  a trained, disciplined, and literate workforce. National 
compulsory education of four years (increased to six years in 1907) was prom- 
ulgated in 1872, though several decades elapsed before virtual universal educa- 
tion was achieved. In 1873 the elementary school enrollment rate for both boys 
and girls was reported to be 28.1 percent. By 1883 it was 51.0 percent, and not 
until 1910 was 98 percent enrollment reported. Precise figures on literacy can 
at best be roughly estimated for the prewar period because of the difficulty in 
defining literacy for the Japanese population. While the ability to sign one’s 
name is often interpreted as an indication  of  literacy  in Western countries, 
knowledge of at least 2,000 Chinese characters in addition to two 50-character 
alphabets is required for functional literacy in the Japanese 1ang~age.I~  More- 
over, enrollment in elementary school is not equivalent to completion and cer- 
tainly not to literacy. For example, the 98 percent enrollment rate in 1910 dis- 
guises  the  estimated  elementary  school  completion  rate  among  those  in 
employable age brackets at the time: 40.6 percent of males and 22.6 percent 
of females (Ohkawa 1968, 136). 
Table 7.6 is a compilation of some of the best estimates of literacy rates for 
the prewar period. Rates of completion of elementary school were used as a 
proxy because it was assumed that four to five years of schooling were neces- 
sary for minimum literacy, and six for functional literacy, “the ability to read, 
15. Excellent analyses and discussions of  this topic can be found in Taira (1971) and Japan 
National Commission for UNESCO (1966). 264  GailHonda 
write, and reckon intelligently for one’s own practical needs” (Taira 1971,376- 
77). The 1897 estimate is from a study of Osaka factory workers  in cotton 
spinning; weaving;  manufacture  of glass, tiles, matches, brushes, blinds,  or 
machinery; shipbuilding; clock and watchmaking, chemical and drug produc- 
tion, and printing. Although the overall percentage of graduates is 21.5, there 
was much variation among the groups. For example, only 9.8 percent of male 
workers in glass and tile manufacturing completed elementary education, as 
compared to 78.7 percent of male workers in printing. The figures for  1902, 
1907, and 1912 were taken from military conscript records from the prefecture 
of Osaka, which might be expected to be higher than the national average be- 
cause of the prefecture’s high urban concentration. Indeed, urban conscripts of 
Osaka had a literacy rate of 87 percent; rural conscripts 70 percent (Taira 197 1, 
379). It was not until the  1920s that near universal literacy as envisioned by 
nineteenth-century architects of the Japanese modern state was attained.16 
Thus, in labor force composition, urbanization, and literacy, Japan had by 
1940 attained levels characteristic of a modern state. The composition of the 
labor force was significantly  altered as the percentage  of  the population in 
agriculture dropped from 75 to 50. The modem industries of  the secondary 
sector included mining and textiles initially, followed by the heavy industries 
of machinery, metal, oil, and chemicals. The modern industries of the tertiary 
sector, which accounted for 25 percent of the labor force in 1940, were primar- 
ily banking and finance, transportation, and commercial trade. To accommo- 
date the  growing nonagricultural  workforce,  the urban  population  of Japan 
went from less than  10 percent of  the total population  in the late nineteenth 
century to nearly 40 percent in 50 years, a phenomenon that required 80 years 
in England and Wales and 75 in the United States at comparables stages of 
industrialization. The increasing sophistication of modern industries in manu- 
facturing and services required a disciplined and literate workforce. Literacy 
rates,  estimated  by  rates  of  completion  of  four  to  six  years  of  elementary 
school, suggest that by  the eve of  the Pacific War near universal  literacy in 
Japan had been achieved. Industrialization, however, also ushered in a new era 
of  health  and welfare for the Japanese population,  one that introduced new 
diseases and stratified society into various levels of physical well-being. 
7.3.2  The Age of Epidemics 
As discussed in section 7.2, no wars were fought during the Tokugawa pe- 
riod until the mid-nineteenth century, when the bakufu government was first 
attacked by  disgruntled han armies from the southern island of  Kytishu. Life 
expectancy during the Tokugawa period was also bolstered relative to prein- 
dustrial Europe by the absence of plague and typhus, and by the limited spread 
16. The 88.7 percent rate for all male conscripts reported for Japan in  1925 surpasses estimated 
literacy rates in 1990  for China, India, and Indonesia. The rate for Japan when females are included 
would be less than 88.7 percent. 265  Industrialization in Japan, 1868-1940 
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Fig. 7.1  Deaths by infectious diseases, 1877-1920 
Sources: 1877-191  I  calculated from It0 (1991); 1918-20  from K0seishB imu kyoku hen (1976 
of  measles, dysentery, and  cholera. In contrast, once ports  were  opened to 
trade,  early industrializing Japan  was swept by  wave after wave of cholera, 
smallpox, dysentery, and Spanish influenza. Figure 7.1 depicts the enormity of 
epidemic mortality figures of acute infectious diseases. 
The worst of  the cholera epidemics took place just after Japan opened its 
ports to foreign trade  in the years of turmoil just preceding  and during the 
Meiji Ishin. Many hundreds of  thousands died in these initial outbreaks until 
the Central  Sanitary Bureau  was able to curb the spread of  cholera through 
isolation of the ill, public education, and sanitation measures. While smallpox 
was the major killer disease of the Tokugawa period, by the Meiji period small- 
pox deaths were reduced to several tens of  thousands as the result of  wide- 
spread efforts to vaccinate all children. The influenza epidemic of 1918-20  in 
Japan killed twice as many people as the great Kant6 earthquake of 1923 and 
was part  of  the worldwide influenza  pandemic  that  claimed  25-30  million 
lives. 
Tuberculosis, while not listed as an epidemic disease, was claiming mortal- 
ity rates of about 0.16 percent of the population around the turn of the century. 
This rate was comparable to that of Western Europe. Rates in Western indus- 
trial countries declined over the first half of the mid-twentieth  century, drop- 
ping to well below 0.10 percent by  1940. Japan's  tuberculosis mortality  rate, 
however, remained high, fluctuating between a low of 0.18 percent in 1932 and 
a high of 0.28 percent in  1945 (see Hunter  1993). It was a well-documented 
killer of  young women in textile factories in early industrializing Japan, and 
one of  the leading causes of death throughout the prewar period along with 
pneumonia and gastrointestinal diseases. 
17. For a detailed expose of the Japanese influenza pandemic, see Rice and Palmer (1993). 266  Gail Honda 
War and epidemics have been discussed at some length to delineate promi- 
nent exogenous factors that distinguish Japan’s preindustrial from its early in- 
dustrial period. They also have significant bearing on the economy and serve to 
illustrate the quality and magnitude of the welfare policy that the government 
enacted to maintain or improve the health of its people. Despite major reforms 
in economic policy and development instituted by the Meiji government, wel- 
fare and health care during this period became only slightly more institutional- 
ized. There was still a heavy reliance on ad hoc measures typical of the Toku- 
gawa period of “mutual fellowship among the people,” that is, dependence on 
the family and community for assistance. The people responded by drawing on 
the firmly established institution of communal k6 from the Tokugawa period. 
Commoners in industrializing Japan-in  villages and cities alike-organized 
themselves into larger insurance and medical co-ops. These were called mujin 
kuisha, literally “unlimited resource companies,” and provided loans and other 
forms of assistance. Unable to rely on the state for health care and welfare, 
the Japanese people pooled resources among themselves to construct enduring 
institutions that continue today as important sources of  credit in the form of 
sdgd ginkd, or “mutual trust bank.” l8 
New forms of  poverty created by industrialization and urbanization, how- 
ever, prompted the passage of the Relief Regulations (Jukkyii Kisoku) in 1874, 
the only institutionalized poor law for 55 years. Though the Relief Regulations 
were passed in emulation of German social policy and English poor laws, gov- 
ernment expenditures in reality were minimal and inconsistent. Medical care 
for the poor was offered and retracted at will. Moreover, it was largely financed 
by contributions solicited from the private sector and donated by the imperial 
household. For all the Home Ministry’s rhetoric to promote the health and wel- 
fare of the people, it failed to support its words with the necessary capital.I9 
7.3.3  Military Expansion at the Expense of Social Welfare 
Welfare, health care, epidemics, and war intersect in peculiar ways in early 
industrializing Japan. First, there appears to be a trade-off between government 
investment in the military and in social welfare. Following Japan’s victory in 
the Russo-Japanese War, the government in 1908 cut the poor relief budget to 
finance military expansion. This act was part of  an effort to increase Japan’s 
world power by “creating a people who worked selflessly for national prosper- 
ity while  making few demands on the  state.” Minimizing relief to the poor 
fitted in well with the centuries-old exhortation to encourage self-reliance and 
to use moral suasion to get people back into the productive labor force (Garon 
1994,82). Seen from the government’s point of view, to build a “wealthy coun- 
18. Najita (1993) brings to light these forms of insurance, health care, and credit in a discussion 
19. This attitude toward poor relief was not unique to Japan. For a broader discussion of  Japa- 
of  commoner participation in and contribution to the industrial revolution. 
nese welfare in historical perspective, see Garon (1994). 267  Industrialization in Japan, 1868-1940 
try and strong army” the return on investment was far greater in the military 
sector than in social welfare. 
Second, the government invested very little in  public health technology so 
that it could instead boost its burgeoning military-industrial complex. For ex- 
ample, widespread measures were taken to bring cholera epidemics of the late 
nineteenth  century under control, but these measures consisted primarily  of 
vaccination  and  promoting  sanitation  through  education  and  propaganda, 
rather than more capital-intensive efforts such as hospital and sanatorium con- 
struction, modern sewer systems, and piped water. Channeling of  funds into 
the military and away from public health may have been a major factor in the 
failure of Japanese life expectancy to keep up with that of contemporary West- 
ern  Europe  in  the  first half  of  the twentieth  century  (Mosk and Johansson 
Finally, with heavy investment in the military, it is not surprising that Japan’s 
major contribution to public health was in the field of military medicine. In the 
Sino-Japanese War Japan lost four times as many men to infectious diseases 
spread in camps as it did  to battlefield  wounds,  a classic historical ratio of 
causes of death in war. By the Russo-Japanese War a decade later, it had man- 
aged to reduce mortality by  infectious diseases in the war to one-fourth of all 
war deaths. This was accomplished through major investments in field hospi- 
tals and laboratories, the latest medicine and equipment, first aid handbooks 
for all soldiers, and a healthy military diet (Johansson and Mosk  1987, 221- 
22). Japan’s advances in military medicine have been called “the real triumph 
of  Japan” by  an American  officer, though  the praise  rings hollow  when  the 
diversion of funds from public health and the ensuing costs are considered. 
1986,430-32). 
7.4  Industrialization and Nutritional Status 
7.4.1  Income and Height 
The positive relationship between income and height as a proxy for nutri- 
tional status has been documented in many studies. These include both analy- 
ses of secular trends and comparisons among socioeconomic groups (see Fogel 
1993; Floud, Wachter, and Gregory  1990; Eveleth and Tanner 1990; Steckel 
1983). Thus it comes as no surprise that average heights of 20-year-old recruits 
in Japan increased during industrialization along with per capita GDP. Figure 
7.2 captures these trends. From 1892 to 1937 there was a fairly steady increase 
in height, from 156.1 cm to 160.3 cm, or an average of 0.91 cm per decade.20 
As a point of comparison, the average height of 160.3 cm for Japanese recruits 
attained in the mid-twentieth century was still a good  3-8  cm shorter than 
20. Because 20-year-old men in the nineteenth century had several more years of  growing left, 
the increase in heights shown in fig. 7.2 is probably overstated. If adjusted for estimated further 
growth in nineteenth-century recruits, the increase in height over the period would be 3.3 cm. or 
an average of 0.7 cm per decade (Shay 1986). 268  Gail Honda 
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Fig. 7.2  Per capita GDP and average height of 20-year-old military recruits, 
1886-1940 
Sources:  Per capita GDP in 1934-36 prices calculated from Ohkawa et al. (1974, 227) for GDP 
and Umemura et al. (1988, 169-71)  for population. Average recruit height from Shay (1986, ap- 
pendix). 
Nofe:  Year is year of measurement for recruits. 
full-grown men  in Great Britain, Norway, Sweden, and Hungary in the mid- 
eighteenth century.21 
This difference has been largely attributed to the genetic pool, but rapid 
increases in heights of Japanese men and women born after World War I1 have 
narrowed the gap. Interestingly, nearly all of the secular trend is due to  an 
increase in leg length. Thus, although Japanese adult height is still one standard 
deviation below that of  North Europeans, their trunk-leg proportions are more 
similar (see Tanner et al. 1982). Reasons for the postwar secular increase in- 
clude better nutrition and greater consumption of  animal protein and dairy 
products, though one study emphasizes urbanization and a decreasing Engel’s 
coefficient over nutrition (Matsumoto 1982). 
Increases in height during industrialization through 1937 were uneven, with 
higher rates of growth (0.4 percent) in 1892-97  and 1917-27,  and lower rates 
of growth (0.1-0.2  percent) in  1907-12  and  1927-37.22 This leveling off  of 
21. For European comparisons, see Fogel (1994). Body mass index, or BMI = weightheight* 
(in kg/m2),  is another predictor of health but is difficult to obtain unless one has individual height 
and weight data. These are not available for Japan on a national scale, but another study shows 
that average BMI for recruits in an agricultural village in Shizuoka prefecture increased from 20 
in 1913 to 21.5 in the mid-l930s, then became erratic in wartime with a downward trend from 
1937 to 1943. It never rose above 21.5, however, which suggests that early-twentieth-century Japa- 
nese recruits were slightly more wasted than American men in  1910, who had an average BMI of 
22.6. See Honda (1996) for Japanese recruits, Kim (1993) for American men. 
22. This change in height trends in the 1930s has also been observed in microlevel studies of 
rural Japan, where average height of  20-year-old recruits tended to decrease in the  1930s (see 
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Sources: Per capita GDP in 1934-36  prices, as in fig. 7.2. Daily caloric intake from Mosk (1978, 
279). 
Per capita GDP and daily caloric intake, 1886-1940 
increases in the  1930s might reflect the decline in daily calorie consumption 
beginning in the early 1920s shown in figure 7.3. The decline is particularly 
pronounced against the backdrop of rising per capita GDP in the late 1930s 
due to military expansion. Why this drop occurred  is unclear, though, based 
on the calculations from which the numbers are derived, it may have been due 
to a change in consumption patterns, a decrease in the total food supply of a 
particular food used in the calculations, or an increase in the populati~n.~~ 
7.4.2  Income, Diet, and Nutrition 
A closer look at diet composition in table 7.7 reveals that most of the calo- 
ries lost in the 1930s were from starchy staple consumpti~n.~~  These declines 
were only partially offset by  increases  in animal protein consumption.  Still, 
grains, noodles, and potatoes accounted for 83.3 percent of the Japanese diet 
through the mid-twentieth century. An estimated 72 calories per day in animal 
protein is scant; most of it probably came from fish and other marine products, 
which have long been a mainstay of the Japanese diet. 
With  estimated  average  caloric  intake between 2,000  and 2,100 (or ac- 
cording to the graph's estimates, between 2,200 and 2,500) and declining from 
the 1920s, and with estimated caloric intake for various occupational catego- 
ries as shown in table 7.8, it is remarkable that heights increased at all during 
23. Caloric intake in fig. 7.3 was derived by calculating total nutrients consumed by food type 
and then dividing through by estimates of total population. Twenty-two food types were used. See 
the appendix in Mosk (1978). 
24. These calorie estimates by  Shinohara were derived differently from those shown in fig. 7.3, 
which were from Mosk (1978). See Kaneda (1970) for an explanation of  Shinohara's estimates. 270  Gail Honda 
Table 7.7  Daily Calories per Capita by Major Food Group, 1911-35 
Starchy  Animal 
Staples  Proteins  Other  Total 
Years  (kcal)  (kcal)  (kcal)  (kcal) 
1911-15  1,765  40  232  2,037 
(86.6)  (2.0)  (11.4)  (100.0) 
1921-25  1,807  47  269  2,123 
(85.1)  (2.2)  (12.7)  (100.0) 
1931-35  1,711  72  272  2,055 
(83.3)  (3.5)  (1 3.2)  (100.0) 
Source: Kaneda (1970,409) 
Nore: Starchy staples include rice, barley, naked barley, other cereals, sweet potatoes, white pota- 
toes, wheat flour, starch, and noodles. Animal proteins include meat, milk, eggs, fish, shellfish, 
and other marine products. Estimates exclude canned and bottled foods and beverages. Figures in 
parentheses are percentages of total calories. 
Table 7.8  Caloric Intake by Occupational Class, 1926-36 
Caloric Intake 
Occupational Class  (kcal) 
Nonfarm household  2,578 
Salaried worker  2,506 
Laborer  2,614 
Farm household  3,265 
Owner or owner-tenant  3,279 
Tenant  3,233 
Source; Sait6 (1989, 349). 
this  period.  Small wonder that the  final adult height  for males in  the  mid- 
twentieth century was far below that of Western industrialized countries. Fur- 
thermore, it seems that those who required the most energy (farmers) were 
also the most economically disadvantaged. As will be shown in section 7.5.2, 
evidence indicates that the combination of lower income and higher energy 
requirements gave rise to one of the shortest occupational classes in industrial- 
izing Japan. 
Until the  1920s, however, caloric intake rose along with per capita GDP. 
This does not mean that Japanese spent more on food as their incomes rose. In 
fact, income elasticities for food have been estimated at 0.3 or 0.4 from 1878 
to 1940, which suggests that despite increasing exposure to Western lifestyles 
during the first half of the twentieth century, people’s food consumption pat- 
terns changed very slowly during the prewar period. This also means that as 
incomes rose, most people still preferred the less expensive starch-based tradi- 
tional Japanese meals to the more expensive Western-style  meat-based fare, 
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Sources: Calculated from MonbushG (1990,270-71) and Umemura (1988, 14-15). 
Another dietary switch that occurred as incomes rose was that from “inferior” 
starches, such as barley and naked barley, to the highly prized polished white 
rice (see Kaneda 1970). Consistently low levels of animal protein in the diet 
may have prevented greater increases in height such as those observed in the 
postwar period: spurts only came once the dietary habits of the Japanese incor- 
porated greater proportions of meats and dairy products. 
7.4.3  Nutritional Status and Growth of Schoolchildren 
While final adult height represents one’s nutritional status from birth through 
age at final height, the tempo of human growth measures one’s physiological 
maturity at given ages. Two people may have the same final height, but they 
may mature at different times, depending on genetics, nutrition, and infection. 
Japanese children tend to mature earlier than European children, though they 
are on average shorter at full maturity. Acute, episodic malnutrition may tem- 
porarily stunt a child’s growth, but full recovery can be expected if malnutrition 
is not protracted. Infectious diseases can prevent the body from absorbing vital 
nutrients even though nutrition is adequate, which can also stunt a child’s de- 
velopment .25 
The tempo of growth of Japanese schoolboys and schoolgirls is depicted in 
figures 7.4 and 7.5. The data are taken from annual reports published by the 
Ministry of  Education  on the physique  and exercise  skills of schoolchildren 
from  1900 through the year of publication. Mandatory education during the 
prewar years was six years. Thus heights recorded after age 12 are probably 
25. This discussion of tempo of growth is from Tanner (1990, chaps. 6 and 9). 272  Gail Honda 
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Sources: As in fig. 1.4. 
Growth of schoolgirls by birth cohort, 1894-1974 
overstating the national average, as those children who could afford to remain 
in school were more likely to come from higher socioeconomic levels and thus 
be taller. Enrollment rates for mandatory elementary school were very high, 
even at the turn of the century. For 1901-5  they were 96.2 percent for boys and 
88.6 percent for girls. By 1911-15  they were about 98 percent for each (Nihon 
ch6kki t6kei sBran  1978, 5:212-31). 
The most useful information to be extracted from these graphs comes from 
comparisons between birth cohorts separated by  20-year intervals. For boys, 
between  1894 and  1914, the early phase of  industrialization,  differences in 
height do not appear until age 9, and they are then maintained at about 2-3  cm 
from age  12 until full maturity. Between  1914 and  1934, the later phase of 
industrialization, differences are quite discernible from age 6. Then the advan- 
tage of the later born begins to decline at around age 9 (with the onset of the 
Pacific War), and average height drops precipitously until 15-year-olds born in 
1934 were no taller than 15-year-olds born in 1894. This reflects severe war- 
time and immediate postwar deprivation and malnutrition. By age 18, the 1934 
cohort has begun to recover from the stunting, and by  age 20 it has almost 
attained its expected height. 
The 1954 and 1974 cohorts are used as a point of comparison for all prewar 
cohorts. Tempo of growth was much greater beginning at age 6 but was most 
prominent during the ages of puberty, between 12 and 15. The rate of increase 
in height is noticeably greater in the postwar cohorts beginning as early as age 
10; it peaks at around age  13. Little growth is observed after age 16. Early 
maturation in the postwar period in comparison with the prewar period has 
been attributed to several reasons. Nutritional reasons include a doubling of 273  Industrialization in Japan, 1868-1940 
animal protein  intake in the six years following the end of  the  Pacific War 
(Mitchell  1962),  an  increase  in  milk  consumption  (Takahashi  1966),  and 
changes in intake of fat, vitamin B2, and eggs (Matsumoto 1982). Socioeco- 
nomic reasons such as increasing urbanization, decreasing family size, and a 
decreasing Engel’s coefficient have also been suggested (Matsumoto 1982). 
Growth of schoolgirls presents a different picture of physiological maturity. 
While final height  is a good 7-10  cm shorter than  that of boys, this is due 
to genetic differences rather than nutritional disadvantagesz6  The difference 
between  the  1894 and  1914 cohorts is apparent  at age 6 and is much more 
pronounced than that of boys. This is consistent with the observation that girls 
experienced a greater degree of  change in average height and experienced it 
earlier than did boys during the first half of the twentieth century (Wall 1993, 
table 7). It is interesting to note, too, that the 1934 girl cohort appeared to have 
weathered  the war deprivations much better than its boy counterpart, at least 
relative to growth of  earlier cohorts. Stunting of growth was less severe and 
seems to have been corrected by age 16. In general, environmental effects are 
more marked in the growth of boys than in that of girls, as one study on the 
effects of the atomic bombing at Hiroshima has shown (Greulich, Giswan, and 
Turner 1953). The difference in rates of increase in height between the prewar 
and postwar cohorts is evident at age 8, two years earlier for girls than for boys. 
Also, girls of the postwar cohorts exhibit little increase in height after age 16, 
whereas boys continued to grow until age 18. 
The differences in tempo of growth among same-sex birth cohorts and be- 
tween  girls  and boys highlight one of  the most  interesting problems in  the 
relationship between  industrialization  and  health, that  is, examining differ- 
ences among subgroups of the population to see whether one group benefited 
more or less than the others in the overall process of  economic growth. The 
following section traces out the development of the differential structure in the 
Japanese economy  and probes the demographic impact of productivity  and 
wage gaps between the modern and traditional sectors. 
7.5  Formation of the Differential Structure 
7.5.1  Gaps in Productivity and Real Income 
As World War  I fueled  the  growth of  Japanese  industries  such  as arms, 
chemicals, and metals, modem large-scale industry for the first time experi- 
enced a skilled labor shortage. As a result, manufacturing processes became 
rationalized for maximum efficiency, which greatly increased not only the pro- 
26. A comparable height gap appears between British boys  and girls in the  1960s in Tanner 
(1990). An analysis of  nutritional status of Japanese boys and girls in the early twentieth century 
shows little evidence of  a female disadvantage with respect  to nutritional resources. See Wall 
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Table 7.9  Real Per Capita GDP by Sector, 1907-40 
Year  Primary  Secondary  Tertiary  I  Year  Primary  Secondary  Tertiary 
1907  154 
1908  156 
1909  158 
1910  150 
1911  159 
1912  158 
1913  160 
1914  174 
1915  178 
1916  195 
1917  189 
1918  190 
1919  205 
1920  203 
1921  182 
1922  188 







































































































Sources: Calculated from Ohkawa et al. (1974, 227) and Umemura et al. (1988, 204-15). 
Nure: GDP in yen, 1934-36  prices. 
ductivity of the modem industrial sector relative to the agricultural and tradi- 
tional manufacturing sectors, but its real wages as well. The productivity  and 
wage gaps widened during the 1920s and  1930s, which led to what is com- 
monly known as the formation of the differential ~tructure.~~ 
In table 7.9 it is clear that productivity by sector-as  measured in real GDP 
per gainful worker28-increased  at varying rates.  Only the secondary sector 
witnessed large and steady gains over the first four decades of  the twentieth 
century. In the primary sector, which includes agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
salt making, per capita real income grew very slowly and stagnated during the 
1920s, the period of agricultural recession. The tertiary sector, which includes 
many  small-scale traditional services, also experienced little growth during 
this period. Thus the differences arose from both rapid growth in large-scale 
manufacturing and little growth in agriculture and traditional industrie~.~~  As 
will be shown in this section, these gaps extended to the health and welfare of 
the people as well. 
27. This gap between modem and traditional sectors is also referred to as the “dual structure” 
or  “dual economy,” more literal translations of nijo kozo. I prefer to use “differential structure,” 
coined by  Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1965), since it is more general and acknowledges more com- 
plexity than a simple modern-traditional dichotomy in economic growth. 
28. May include part-time workers. See Ohkawa (1957, 142). 
29. Analysis by  sector serves only as a proxy for the true differential structure that emerges 
between so-called modem and traditional industries. Modem industry comprises goods and ser- 
vices introduced after the Meiji Ishin and those dependent on foreign technology (e.g., banking, 
communications, transportation, arms, and medicine). Traditional industry includes old traditional 275  Industrialization in Japan, 1868-1940 
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Fig. 7.6  Average height of 20-year-old  recruits by prefectural type, 1899-1937 
Source: Calculated from Shay (1986, appendix). 
Nore: Year is year of measurement. Industrial = less than 40 percent of labor force in agriculture 
in  1930; intermediate = 40-60 percent of labor force in agriculture in 1930; agricultural = more 
than 60 percent of labor force in agriculture in 1930. See Taeuber (1958, 88). 
7.5.2  Differential Height 
To  determine whether the gaps in real wages between the traditional  and 
modern sectors are manifested in the heights of those employed in the respec- 
tive sectors, national recruit height data were divided into categories that would 
come closest to representing those sectors. Recruit height data were available 
by prefecture, so prefectures were divided into three categories: industrial, in- 
termediate, and agricultural (according to Taeuber 1958,88). Industrial prefec- 
tures had less than 40 percent of their labor force in agriculture; intermediate, 
between 40 and 60 percent; and agricultural, over 60 percent. The number of 
prefectures of different types totaled 7, 20, and 20, respectively. 
The results are shown in figure 7.6. With clarity and consistency, recruits 
from  industrial  prefectures  are  tallest,  those  from  agricultural  prefectures 
shortest, and those from intermediate prefectures somewhere in between, but 
closer to those from industrial prefectures.  Moreover, the gaps are increasing 
over time so that on the eve of the War with China, industrial recruits were on 
average close to 2 cm taller than agricultural recruits. At the turn of the century, 
goods and services that existed before the Meiji Ishin (e.g., stonecutting, carpentry, food produc- 
tion, ricksha driving, and geisha) and new traditional goods and services that were originally intro- 
duced from the West but retained a traditional organizational structure (e.g., textile manufacture, 
tinsmithing, shoemaking, and painting). Modem and traditional industries can also be character- 
ized by firm size. Though many exceptions exist, modem industry almost always refers to large- 
scale firms, while traditional industry, both old and new, has a strong association with small-scale, 
especially "midget"  (one to three worker) enterprises. See Nakamura (1983,27-28)  and Ohkawa 
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Fig. 7.7  Crude death rate by prefectural type, 1896-1937 
Source: Calculated from Nihon feikoku  t&ei  nenkan (1899-1906,  1929-37). 
Nofet Number of deaths per 1,000 population. Definitions of industrial, intermediate, and agricul- 
tural prefectures as in fig. 7.6. 
40 years earlier, there was virtually no difference between any of the heights. 
Thus total gains in average height over the period of industrialization for indus- 
trial, intermediate, and agricultural recruits were 4.1, 3.6, and 2.8 cm. Since 
recruitment physical examinations took place in the village, town, or city of 
birth, heights would be fairly accurate in measuring one's nutritional status and 
environmental  effects  from birth  through  recruitment  in  one's  hometown. 
There may have been  some migration in the later teen years as young men 
sought employment, but they would return to their place of birth for recruit- 
ment registration, so migration effects are minimized. 
7.5.3  Differential Mortality 
The same process of dividing prefectures into industrial, intermediate, and 
agricultural categories was performed on national statistics from the Cabinet 
Statistical Bureau, which covers the entire population, not just recruits. These 
are the so-called official statistics, which many have cautioned against using 
since they  tend to underreport  certain measurements.  Since this analysis is 
more  concerned  with  relative  intersectoral  differences  than  with  absolute 
changes over time, using the official statistics may not be problematic. Figure 
7.7 depicts crude death rates for each prefectural type (statistics for the years 
1907-28  were unavailable). It appears that industrialization had a positive ef- 
fect on mortality, as crude death rates for industrial prefectures were reduced 
from a high of 23 per 1,000 at the turn of the century to 15 by the late 1930s. 
Crude death rates in agricultural and intermediate prefectures showed only 277  Industrialization in Japan, 1868-1940 
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Fig. 7.8  Crude birthrate by prefectural type, 1899-1937 
Source: Calculated from Nihon teikoku tdkei nenkan (1899-1906,  1929-37). 
Note: Number of recorded births per 1,OOO population. Definitions of  industrial, intermediate, and 
agricultural prefectures as in fig. 7.6. 
slight declines so that the high-to-low gradient from industrial to agricultural 
mortality was virtually reversed by the late 1920s.  The reasons for this reversal 
include better medical care and public health measures in the cities in the later 
stages of industrialization, which mitigate the overcrowding and spread of in- 
fectious diseases characteristic of urban areas in the early stages of industrial- 
ization (see Mosk and Johansson 1986). 
7.5.4  Differential Fertility 
In crude birthrate, as shown in figure 7.8,  there is little difference among the 
three  prefectural  types in  the  early  stages  of  industrialization.  By  the  late 
1920s, the differences are pronounced  and consistent. Agricultural birthrates 
are the highest, fluctuating between 32 and 35 per 1,000 population; intermedi- 
ate, next highest, between 30 and 34; and urban, the lowest, between 26 and 
30. Decline in birthrates is a much noted phenomenon of the so-called demo- 
graphic transition from a traditional,  agriculture-based  society to a modem, 
industrial society. Urbanization and its attendant crowded living conditions in 
particular tend to reduce the number of children that people feel they can com- 
fortably have, both financially and with regard to living space. Better educa- 
tion, which generally accompanies modem, industrial life, leads people to pre- 
fer "quality" of children over quantity. They prefer to invest available resources 
in more human capital for fewer children. In Japan birthrates on average do 
not appear to have declined very much over time, but the cross-sectional differ- 
ences among sectors are significant. 
In stillbirth rate per live births, shown in figure 7.9, agricultural prefectures 278  Gail Honda 
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Fig. 7.9  Stillbirth rate by prefectural type, 1899-1937 
Source: Calculated from Nihon feikoku t&ei  nenkan (1899-1906, 1929-37). 
Note: Number of  recorded stillbirths per 100 live births. Definitions of industrial, intermediate, 
and agricultural prefectures as in fig. 7.6. 
seem to be at a slight disadvantage in the early phases of industrialization. The 
situation is reversed by the late 1920s, with industrial prefectures showing on 
average one more stillbirth than the other prefectural types. This is consistent 
with another study, which showed that there was a high-to-low gradient in still- 
birth rate from coastal to valley to mountain villages (representing decreasing 
levels of industrialization) in Shizuoka prefecture (Honda 1995). While causes 
of natural stillbirth are still largely unexplained, ones commonly cited are hy- 
pertension,  antepartum  hemorrhage  and  small-for-gestational-age  fetuses 
(Herschel et al. 1994). Since these causes relate to prenatal care and maternal 
health, the reversal in figure 7.9 suggests that prenatal stress was higher for 
women in industrial prefectures. Intersectoral differences aside, the large drop 
in all sectors of the stillbirth rate indicate an overall improvement in the lives 
of women in their childbearing years. 
While improved prenatal care and maternal health can account for some of 
the decline in natural stillbirths, they cannot account for the dramatic drop in 
stillbirth rates for all types of prefectures between  1910 and 1930. There ap- 
pears to have been a change in reporting methods or a large decline in the rate 
of unnatural stillbirths. The precise definition of stillbirth used in this data set 
is unclear, since abortion, infanticide, natural losses, and deaths of infants up 
to one month old were often combined in a single category. Since no change 
in  reporting  methods has been  documented, it might  be hypothesized  that 
much of the decline occurred among unnatural stillbirths, that is, abortion and 
infanticide. When stillbirths are divided into legitimate and illegitimate catego- 
ries, the stillbirth rate for illegitimate births was on the order of 5 to 10 times 279  Industrialization in Japan, 1868-1940 
higher  than  that  for legitimate  births  from the  1920s  through  the  1940s. 
For example, in  1930 the stillbirth rate in large cities was 53 per 1,000 live 
births  for legitimate  children  and  558 per  1,000 live births  for illegitimate 
children. Outside the  cities, the  respective rates were  48 and  314 (Taeuber 
Also, stillbirth rates were higher among mothers of  marginal childbearing 
ages (below 20 and over 40 years) in the prewar period. The high stillbirth rate 
among mothers below 20 years of age is undoubtedly linked to the high still- 
birth rate among illegitimate births. There was also social stigma attached to 
older women giving birth, as though being old and pregnant was shameful or 
inappr~priate.~~  Hence, if  the  larger part of the decline occurred among in- 
duced stillbirths, it must have occurred mostly among illegitimate births and 
births among women of marginal childbearing ages. In other words, there must 
have been a decline in abortion and infanticide among mothers to whose preg- 
nancies some social stigma was attached. A possible explanation for this is the 
loosening of social ties and weakening of  social mores that accompanied mas- 
sive migration during industrialization. It was far easier for a woman to take 
her illegitimate pregnancy  to term if  she was living in a city away from the 
tight social nexus of her family and village. 
1958,270-71). 
7.6  Conclusion 
The formation of the differential structure between modem and traditional 
sectors during industrialization was manifested in the health of the Japanese 
people. Average heights of  20-year-old recruits, when segregated into indus- 
trial, intermediate, and agricultural prefectures, displayed increasing differen- 
tials from 1899 to 1937. This is in accord with higher real income for nonagri- 
cultural workers in large-scale industries and lower real income for agricultural 
workers,  which were characteristic of the differential structure. In addition, 
agricultural workers had much higher caloric requirements, which dealt a dou- 
ble blow to nutritional status: lower income and higher intake. The results are 
as expected: beginning with virtually  no average height differences in  1899, 
industrial recruits grew an average of 4.1 cm, intermediate recruits 3.6 cm, and 
agricultural recruits 2.8 cm. 
Mortality differentials, derived from national statistics for the entire popula- 
tion, were reversed over time. In the early phases of industrialization, industrial 
prefectures had the highest rates of mortality; agricultural, the lowest. By the 
late 1920s, the gradient was reversed, with the death rate of agricultural prefec- 
tures 2-4  points higher than that of industrial prefectures. Reasons for the re- 
versal include better medical care and public health measures in the cities in 
30. “In those days it was considered a great disgrace to have a baby after the age of forty-they 
were usually either aborted or killed at birth. A middle-aged woman only had to look tired or slack 
off from work and tongues would start wagging” (Saga 1987,210). 280  Gail Honda 
the later stages of  industrialization, which mitigated the effects of  the over- 
crowding and spread of infectious diseases characteristic of urban areas in the 
early stages of industrialization. 
Crude birthrates of  different areas were virtually  indistinguishable in the 
first decade of the twentieth century, but by the 1930s, patterns were clear and 
consistent. Agricultural birthrates were highest, fluctuating between 32 and 34 
(per 1,000 population); intermediate, between 30 and 34; industrial, between 
26 and 30. Industrialization and its attendant urbanization  tend to reduce the 
number of  children that people feel they can comfortably have. In addition, 
better education, which generally accompanies modern, industrial life, leads 
people to prefer “quality”  of  children over quantity. In stillbirth rates, which 
are inversely related  to quality prenatal care and maternal health, industrial 
prefectures were at a slight disadvantage. Overall, however, the large drop in 
stillbirth rates for all sectors suggests a general  improvement  in the lives of 
women in their childbearing years. 
Military expansion and war were major stimulants to the Japanese economy 
and contributed to the rise in per capita GDP during the period of industrializa- 
tion. For example, although Japan was not a direct participant in it, World War 
I spurred the GNP to growth rates of 6-9  percent. Another positive effect was 
the breakthrough in military medicine and hygiene through research and edu- 
cation. This greatly reduced the number of  deaths due to infectious diseases 
in  battle camps  between  the  Sino-Japanese War  (1  894-95)  and  the  Russo- 
Japanese War (1904-5). 
On the other hand, in the effort to meet the state objective  of  building a 
rich country and strong army (fukoku kycydhei), the government heavily favored 
amassing  a  formidable  military-industrial  complex  over investing  in  social 
welfare, health care, public health technology, sanitation, and insurance.31  The 
people’s response was to draw on the centuries-old institution of  communal 
associations (ka)  and to form their own co-ops and companies that provided 
insurance, credit, and health care. Nevertheless, lack of  major capital invest- 
ments in public health on the part of the state may have delayed the control of 
epidemics in the early stages of industrialization and contributed to the stagna- 
tion of life expectancy throughout the period of industrialization. 
Direct effects of war on the health  of  the people  can be observed in the 
growth of schoolboys and schoolgirls. Birth cohorts of  1934, who would have 
reached puberty during the final years of the Pacific War and its devastating 
aftermath, showed significant stunting in both sexes. The effect on boys was 
more severe and protracted, as signs of stunting can be observed from ages 10 
to 19, and 1934 birth cohorts at age 15 were no taller than their 1894 counter- 
parts at age  15. Girls recovered  more quickly, and the effects they suffered 
3 1. See Honda (1995, table 6.  I), in which it is shown that the Japanese government spent any- 
where from 10 to 1,000 times more on defense than on public welfare each year from I868 to 1942. 281  Industrialization in Japan, 1868-1940 
were less severe. They showed signs of stunting from ages 10 to 16, and their 
heights did not drop to 1894 cohort levels. 
While increases in per capita income can lead to some benefits for an indus- 
trializing society, per capita income is not well correlated with all measures of 
health. In the case of Japan, height as a proxy for nutritional status increased 
with per capita income, but leveled off in the 1930s even though per capita 
GDP rose rapidly. The leveling-off reflected a decrease in caloric intake, which 
in turn may have been due to the distribution of a limited amount of resources 
to a burgeoning population. Mortality rates and income are somewhat corre- 
lated over time and across occupational class, though reduction in mortality in 
higher income, industrial areas only occurred in the later stages of industrial- 
ization. Fertility rates and income are negatively correlated, but once again, 
only in the later stages of industrialization. In the early stages, industrial and 
agricultural birthrates are virtually indistinguishable. Thus, the relationship be- 
tween industrialization and health is not a simple one: in addition to income, 
it is critical to consider the stage of industrialization and where the additional 
resources from higher income are being channeled. 
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